Security Imperative
Supply-chain assurance is now a grid resilience issue
The myth of the safe perimeter is already broken. Every connected device, update and supplier is now within reach of attackers.

By Prof. Will Drury, Dr Kinan Ghanem and Alan Ritchie

In October 2026, a cyber attack disrupted refrigeration systems across hundreds of French supermarkets, causing food spoilage, operational disruption and significant financial losses. Three weeks later, a second wave hit supermarkets in several other European countries, including Belgium, Sweden and Ireland. In both cases, attackers remotely manipulated connected refrigeration controls, a stark reminder that cyber attacks are no longer confined to IT systems. They now directly affect physical assets, operational processes and essential services — and, where critical national infrastructure (CNI) is targeted, they could affect all our daily lives.

Supermarket refrigeration may seem far removed from the energy transition, but the underlying lesson is identical. Modern operational technology (OT) systems increasingly rely on connectivity, remote access, digital control and data‑driven optimisation. The same trends transforming retail, manufacturing and logistics are reshaping our future energy systems.

Smart grids, distributed energy resources, EV charging infrastructure, renewables, heat networks, battery storage systems, flexibility services and intelligent energy management platforms promise a cleaner, more flexible and more efficient energy future. Yet every new digital connection creates a potential new attack vector. A compromised refrigeration system can spoil food.

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A compromised energy system could disrupt critical infrastructure, destabilise operations and undermine public confidence in the transition to net zero.

The Hidden Risk: Supply-Chain Vulnerabilities in OT Systems

These attacks also expose a deeper structural challenge: vulnerabilities increasingly enter critical infrastructure through the supply chain. Modern OT environments depend on multi‑vendor components, cloud‑managed platforms, remote‑support services, firmware update pipelines and third‑party integrators. A single weakness in any of these layers can propagate across hundreds or thousands of assets simultaneously, regardless of where the equipment is manufactured or how “sensitive” the device appears.

In the energy sector, this risk is amplified. Grid-connected devices — from EV chargers to battery storage controllers — rely on embedded chips, boards, firmware images and trust anchors sourced globally. If any part of that chain is compromised or non-compliant with standards, the resulting vulnerability becomes a grid-level risk.

Ageing OT technologies compound the problem, because physical asset lifetimes and software support lifetimes are rarely the same. A protection relay or substation control system may remain operational for decades. The software and firmware inside it will typically be supported by the supplier for a fraction of that. Once support ends, newly discovered vulnerabilities go unpatched, yet the asset carries on doing its job on the network. Unlike a laptop, it cannot simply be replaced when the updates stop. The second wave of refrigeration attacks made the point: the manufacturer said the systems affected were those that had not been updated. Supply‑chain assurance is therefore not a one‑off check at the point of purchase. It is a question of whether equipment can be kept secure for as long as it stays in service.

This is why emerging frameworks such as ENA’s Cyber Security Procurement Guidelines , IEC 62443 supply‑chain requirements and NIS2 obligations emphasise provenance, secure update pipelines, vendor assurance and continuous validation. Compliance is essential — but compliance alone is not enough. Supply‑chain security must be engineered, demonstrated and independently validated.

Digital Substations: Where Supply‑Chain Risk Meets Grid Criticality

The transition to digital substations makes this challenge even more urgent. Digital substations rely on intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), merging units, protection relays, sensors, time-synchronisation modules and embedded communication processors — all containing complex hardware and firmware sourced from global supply chains.

secure authentication and supply-chain validation in IEC 61850

These components determine how the grid behaves under fault conditions, how protection schemes operate and how automation responds to real-time events. A single compromised board, tampered firmware image, unverified trust anchor or vulnerable cloud-based configuration tool can directly affect grid protection and stability.

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This is why modern digital substation architectures must adopt zero-trust principles. Zero trust is not just an IT concept; it is a practical engineering approach for the digital grid.

No device, update or communication should be trusted simply because it sits inside the perimeter. Every device, every message between devices and every configuration change must prove it is genuine, and keep proving it. But in a substation, security cannot come at the cost of performance. Protection and control systems have to keep doing their job exactly as designed, so security measures that interfere with them create a different kind of risk. Zero trust has to be applied in a way that protects the grid without compromising how it operates.

There is a further challenge. While individual devices may meet relevant security requirements, this does not necessarily demonstrate how resilient they will be when integrated with equipment, communications networks and software from other suppliers. A digital substation is a system, not a collection of parts, and its weaknesses can sit in the joins between them. The only way to find those weaknesses is to bring the technologies together and test how they interact under realistic operating conditions.

AI Widens the Supply Chain

AI adds another layer to the supply chain. As it becomes embedded in digital substations and grid‑edge devices, the models, training data and update pipelines behind it become things that must be trusted, and that can be tampered with. Attackers can also now use AI to find and exploit weaknesses faster and at greater scale. Both trends strengthen the case for the same discipline: knowing where every component comes from, and validating it before it reaches the live network.

Security Cannot Be Bolted On — It Must Be Engineered In

At PNDC, we have been highlighting this challenge through our work on resilient future energy systems and the convergence of energy, communications and cyber‑physical technologies. Alongside colleagues from academia, industry and our wider research and industrial partners, we have consistently argued that cyber security must be treated as a core engineering discipline. It cannot be bolted on at the end of a project or considered only at the point of deployment. It must be designed, tested and validated from the outset.

The refrigeration attacks should be a wake‑up call for anyone responsible for critical infrastructure. Today it is supermarket refrigeration. Tomorrow it could be grid‑connected assets, EV charging networks, battery storage systems, heat networks or digital substations.

If you are deploying, operating, regulating or investing in digitally connected energy infrastructure, the question is not whether cyber threats will emerge, but whether your systems have been tested against them.

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Why PNDC’s Role Is Essential

Digital energy systems cannot be secured through procurement checklists, vendor claims or paperwork alone. Nor is it enough to test each device on its own. Complete systems must be brought together, tested and challenged in a safe, representative environment before deployment. This is where PNDC provides unique value: we test not just individual technologies, but how they perform together as a system. At PNDC, we:

  • Bring together multi‑vendor digital substation equipment and evaluate it as a complete system
  • Test how devices behave under cyber‑physical stress
  • Validate firmware provenance and trust‑anchor robustness
  • Assess interoperability under zero‑trust conditions
  • Examine secure‑update behaviour and supply‑chain integrity
  • Expose systems to realistic operational scenarios, including spoofed messages, degraded timing signals and stressed communication networks

This allows organisations to verify compliance, uncover hidden vulnerabilities, test response strategies and build confidence that the complete system, not just its individual components, will behave securely and predictably when connected to the live grid.

Supply‑chain security cannot be assumed.
It must be engineered.
It must be demonstrated.
And it must be independently validated.

A Simple Challenge to the Energy Sector

Do not wait for your own refrigeration moment.

Whether you are a network operator, technology developer, asset owner, regulator or policy‑maker, now is the time to act. Look beyond the security of individual technologies and consider the resilience of the complete systems we are building. Use the UK’s world‑class energy innovation infrastructure to test those systems, challenge your assumptions and understand your vulnerabilities before an attacker does.

The energy transition depends on public trust. That trust will not be built solely on innovation, decarbonisation or digitalisation. It will be built on confidence that the systems we deploy are secure, resilient and capable of withstanding the threats they will inevitably face.

The threat is real.
The technology is already being deployed.
The time to test, secure and strengthen our future energy systems is now.

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PNDC tests digital substations and connected energy technologies as complete systems, under realistic cyber‑physical conditions, before they reach the live network.

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